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Eminent Domain Date of Valuation in Ohio
John Lombardo*
T HE INTERPRETATIONS that judicial bodies have placed on eminent do-
main provisions of the federal and state constitutions have caused
much controversy and concern over the years, particularly concerning
the insuring of fair and equitable applications of the "just compensation"
limitations.
The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States con-
tains the clause: ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." The fourteenth amendment to the Consti-
tution incorporates this requirement of "just compensation" into the
"due process" with which all state actions must comply.1
Similarly Ohio's Constitution states:
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the
public welfare. . . where private property shall be taken for public
use, a compensation therefore shall first be made in money or first
secured by a deposit of money, and such compensation shall be as-
sessed by a jury, without deduction for any benefits to any property
of the owner.2
Now as never before, with both national and state governments ap-
propriating greater quality and quantity of land for public use for limited
access highways, urban renewal projects, airports, parks, and flood con-
trol districts,3 the courts are charged with the duty of protecting the
constitutional rights of the affected property owners.
This article is devoted to analyzing the interpretations and appli-
cations that Ohio courts have given to the mandate of "just compensa-
tion." Particular emphasis will be given to the date of valuation of
this "just compensation," and the relevance of a change in market value
of the property to be taken due to activity or delay of the appropriating
authority in the area of the taking prior to the date of taking.
The universally accepted measure of "just compensation" for prop-
erty taken by an approriating authority for public use is the fair market
value of that property.4 The fair market value of property is the price
at which a willing seller and willing buyer will trade, where both are
aware of all the beneficial uses to which the property can be put, and
neither is under any compulsion to act. 5 In the case of a total take (con-
* B.S., Carnegie Mellon University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State Univer-
sity College of Law; Civil Engineer, Ohio Department of Highways. [Note: This
paper should not be taken to represent any views other than those of the writer per-
sonally or the authorities cited by him as cited.]
1 Chicago B.&O. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 4 (1964).
2 OHIO CoNsT. art I, § 19.
3 Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for Unconstitutional
Practice, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 319 (1963).
4 4 NIrCHOLS, LAw or EMNENT DoMAIN, § 12.1, 9-17 (rev. 3rd ed. 1962).
5 BLACKS LAW DICTONaRY 716 (4th ed. 1951); SEMENOW, QUESTIONS AND AN4SWERS ON
REAL ESTATE 393 (5th ed. 1964); 4 NICHOLS supra n. 4 § 12.2 (1), 48-54.
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demnation of the entire property of an owner), the property owner is
entitled to the fair market value of his entire property. Where only a
partial take is required for the public improvement (a taking of less
than all of the property, or less than a fee simple taking of the prop-
erty) the property owner is entitled to the difference between the fair
market value of the land before the taking, and the fair market value
of his remaining property after the taking, without deduction for any
benefits from the improvement.0
In the market place the fair market value of property is determined
at a given time by the interaction of the demand for property of that na-
ture, and the supply of such property. The demand of property is de-
termined by a number of factors, including but not limited to location,
community development, zoning, income producing ability, physical
characteristics, and anticipated future trends in surrounding develop-
ments.7 These factors are dependent on time, and can vary considerably
over a few years, therefore, the importance of an appropriate selection
of date of valuation can be seen.8 Great problems and injustices can arise
when properties in certain areas are designated for condemnation, but
not physically taken nor valued by the appropriating agency until after
extensive delays. Where the evaluation does not occur within a reason-
able time from the designation, and the property values have decreased
in the interim because of this designation, who should bear the loss? If
property values increase due to this designation, to whom should the
benefits accrue?
Increased Property Values
"The rule of law is well established, in Ohio and elsewhere, that the
fair market value of property appropriated, which property is a part of a
program of improvement by a public body, can not be enhanced by the
value of such improvement to it." 9 The Supreme Court of Ohio stated
in Nichols v. City of Cleveland:
Where one entire plan has been adopted for a public improvement
and from the inception a certain tract of land has been actually in-
cluded therein, the owner of such tract in a condemnation proceed-
ing therefor is not entitled to an increased value which may result
from the improvement, where its appropriation is a condition prece-
dent to the existence of the improvement."l
The Sixth Circuit Court of Ohio, in Gibson et al v. City of Norwalk,
said:
In determining the market value of the various tracts of land sought
to be appropriated, the jury is precluded from considering their en-
hanced value, if any they may have, on account of the contemplated
improvement in the water-works by the city."
6 Omo REv. CODE § 163.14 (1966); OaIo CoNsT. art. I, § 19.
7 A BMERICAN INSTTUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, 1, 2
(4th ed. 1964); SEMENOW, supra note 5, at 395.
8 Glaves, supra note 3, at 327, 328.
9 City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E. 2d 52 (1963).
10 104 Ohio St. 19, 135 N.E. 291 (1922).
11 13 Ohio C.C.R. 6 (1896).
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In Ohio it is well established that the jury must assess the "just
compensation" due the property owner, without regard to any en-
hancement in value to his property caused by the designation of the
public improvement. The increased value resulting from the public im-
provement must be extracted from the market value determination at
whatever point in time the property is valued.
Decreased Property Values
Since the property owner is not entitled to any increased value
which may result from a proposed improvement, it seems only just that
he should not be penalized for any detrimental effects to the value
caused by an improvement. A valuation date should be selected which
would preclude adverse effects acting upon property value due to acts
or delays of the appropriating body prior to the taking. The problem
arises because the "rule of law probably the most solidly entrenched in
eminent domain evaluation (save the fair market value rule), is that
damages to the land owner are to be assessed as of the date of taking
(or 'date of take' as it is called in Ohio). This rule arose from the
necessity to freeze fluctuating market values at a definite date. The rule
is plagued, however, by that age old legal paradox that hard and fast
standards can be both necessary and futile." 12
The date of take is variously designated among different jurisdic-
tions. In the federal courts it is the date at which a "Declaration of
Taking" is filed with the court. 13 In various state jurisdictions, it can be
the date the petition for condemnation is filed, the date of issuance of
summons, the time of trial, the date of deposit of assessed damages, or
the time of final decree of condemnation. 14 In all jurisdictions it is no
later than the date of actual possession by the condemnor. 15
In Ohio the date of take is the earlier of either the date of trial, or
date of actual possession.'6 This inflexible "date of valuation equals date
of take" rule can lead to unjust results. The following situations clearly
illustrate this possibility:
1. Property owner is prohibited from making necessary im-
provements to a structure on his property, because it is in an area
designated for an improvement. Because of this prohibition, his
property becomes a hazard to the community necessitating removal
of the structure before the physical taking by the appropriating au-
thority. In such a situation the owner loses the value of the struc-
ture, for only the fair market value of his barren property is de-
termined.
12 Duffy, Depreciation Damages in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 18 CLsv.-MAR. L.
Rlv. 106, 108 (1969).
13 40 U.S.C.A. § 258 (a), n. 129.
14 Glaves, supra n. 3 at 326.
15 Id.
16 Stribley v. City of Cincinnati, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 54 (1st Ohio Cir. Ct. 1894); Ornstein
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 26 Ohio L. Abs. 78, 36 N.E. 2d 521 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937);
City of Cleveland v. Kacrnarik, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 177 N.E. 2d 811 (C.P., Cuyahoga
County 1961); Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 118 N.E. 2d 682 (1954); Long
v. Director of Highways, 15 Ohio App. 2d 226, 240 N.E. 2d 569 (1968).
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2. Because of haphazard purchasing and demolition procedures
employed by the appropriating agency, the neighborhood surround-
ing an owner's property degenerates, greatly devaluing the property
before his taking occurs.
The first situation usually results from a local municipality refusing
to issue building repair permits or to approve zoning change applica-
tions for properties located within an area designated for a county or
state highway improvement, in an attempt to keep eventual acquisition
costs down. Without a permit the property owner can not add to or im-
prove his property after an intention for the improvement is made
known." The property will generally fall into such a condition as to
render it uninhabitable, and the local municipality duly exercising its
police power to abate nuisances, can have the building razed.18 Because
the municipality is not the appropriating body (the county or state that
will eventually acquire title to the property), the demolition orders
cannot be considered a taking by the appropriating authority.19 The
property owner would then bear the loss to the value of the structure
including the demolition costs, as was the case in Director of Highways
v. Olrich.20 The facts are briefly as follows: In June of 1960 the property
owner, pursuant to instructions from the city to make repairs on his
premises, made application for a building repair permit. The applica-
tion was refused on the grounds that the property was to be taken for a
state highway. In October, 1960, the city's Urban Renewal Director cer-
tified the property for abatement with full knowledge that it was to be
taken for the highway, on the grounds that it was inadequate, unsafe,
and unhealthful. In 1963, the Ohio Department of Highways took pos-
session of the property but the trial was not held until later.
The trial court, in an attempt to prevent an injustice, set the date
of take as October, 1960 (the date that the property was condemned or
certified for abatement). The Ohio Supreme Court reversed this de-
cision, reaffirming the date of trial or actual possession standards of
valuation, and set the date of take in 1963 the time of actual possession
stating: "A valid order directing that a property be vacated as unfit for
human habitation is not a taking for public use, requiring eminent do-
main proceedings or amounting to a taking for the purpose of establishing
a date of valuation in a pending eminent domain proceeding." 21 The
court justified this ruling on the basis of causation, contending that the
appropriating body (the Highway Department) was not the cause of the
certification for abatement. The Court stated that the abatement order
was not grounded on the highway taking, but was a valid exercise of
police power which was not formally appealed from at the time. The
Court further stated that whether or not a building permit can be denied
17 OHIO REV. CODE § 715.26(a) (1965).
Is Id. at (b); OHio REV. CODE § 3707.01 (1953).
19 Director of Highways v. Olrich, 5 Ohio St. 2d 70, 213 N.E. 2d 823 (1966).
20 Id.
21 Id.
Sept. 197120 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3)
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because a property lies within the path of a proposed highway was not in
issue, because appellee Olrich had failed to make this formal appeal.
22
Only in those cases where the same agency that eventually does
the appropriating issues the certification of abatement or refuses the
zoning change would the courts relent. 23 In City of Cleveland v. Kac-
marik, the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County let the property
owner offer evidence of the property value just before the razing by
the City where the City itself appropriated the property for urban re-
newal.
24
The refusal to approve zoning change applications, because of a
proposed public project, can also lead to a deprivation of property
rights. The owner is prevented from realizing the benefits from the
highest and best use of his land-an inherent right of property owner-
ship. Zoning change applications however, were also denied by mu-
nicipalities when the property was in a designated area, on the basis
that to allow rezoning and private improvements on such properties
would be a burden on the appropriating authority, because of the
eventual increased market value of the improved properties. Only if a
zoning board denied such applications in areas that were not formally
designated for improvement, would the courts protect the inherent
property rights.25
The Legislature of Ohio has found a partial solution to some of
the injustices involved by enacting Section 5511.01 of the Ohio Revised
Code, effective 11-14-67. This section provides that upon the submission
of an application for zoning change, permit for land use, alteration or
erection of a structure, or moving of structure, effecting any land with-
in 300 feet of the centerline of a proposed highway, or within 500 feet
from the point of intersection of said centerline with any public road,
the authority authorized to approve these submissions must notify the
Director of Highways by registered mail at once. Within 120 days from
this action, the Director shall either proceed to acquire any land needed
from the submitter, or find that an acquisition at such time is not in the
public interest. If the latter occurs, the authority having power to issue
such permits shall proceed to do so. Improvements allowed will be com-
pensated for in any later acquisition of the subject property by the High-
way Department. These provisions solve some of the problems in high-
way takings by providing that there will be no more than a 120 day delay.
The second situation discussed previously has not and probably
can not be easily remedied. The problem stems from the difficulty in or-
ganizing effective programs of large scale acquisitions and demolition of
private property for public use. The overall public welfare must be
weighed against individual property rights, and a balance struck to
reach the fairest and most equitable result. As soon as a highly ur-
22 Id. at 73, 213 N.E. 2d at 825.
23 City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 177 N.E. 2d 811 (C.P., Cuya-
hoga County 1961).
24 Id. at 138, 177 N.E. 2d at 814.
25 Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 118 N.E. 2d 682 (1954).
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banized area is slated for taking for a public improvement (usually for
urban renewal or highway purposes), it becomes subject to "planning
blight" 20 and property values start falling. This designation has essen-
tially had the effect of taking the affected properties out of the normal
market. Delays in acquisition can result in these properties being
greatly devalued by the date of take. As one court stated the problem:
Beyond any doubt it is possible for much injustice to creep into the
proceedings particularly when there is a wholesale taking of prop-
erty in a given area. The very size of the problem of taking many
parcels places a heavy burden on the condemnor, the property
owners, and the courts. Each separate parcel must be appraised, its
owners called in to confer about settlement, and in the absence of
agreement, its value must be determined by a jury. As houses
begin to come down, tenants in nearby homes move out, the neigh-
borhood deteriorates or is deserted, vandalism often sets, in ap-
pearances and values depreciate with the result that frequently the
property owner is greatly handicapped in presenting his case to the
jury by the time his land gets into court.2 7
Even when the exact areas of take of the urban properties are
known, it is very difficult to achieve safe, expedient methods of acquisi-
tion and clearing. The areas slated for urban renewal are often the
higher crime rate ghetto areas. During the renewal operations essential
services such as rubbish removal, and police protection must not only
be maintained, but increased to insure the protection of property rights
as well as the well-being of the residents of the affected area.
The problem is further aggravated in the case of highway con-
struction. The centerline of the proposed highway must first be estab-
lished.28 Several potential corridor locations of the proposed highway
are presented by the Director of Highways or his representative at
public hearings, and any and all proponents and opponents of the
various routes are given a chance to present their views. The Director
of Highways then takes all these factors into consideration, and makes
a determination as to the location of the proposed highway's centerline.
The centerline is thus established and recorded in the Highway Director's
Journal. 29 Parcels of land within a certain distance of this centerline
will be needed in their entirety, and acquisition of these may begin at
once. Properties on the fringes, however, may or may not be needed
in part or in total. Final plans determining the exact location of access
roads, grade elimination, drainage facilities, utility relocations etc.,
must be prepared. The approval of these plans by all the agencies
that may be involved-the Federal Bureau of Public Roads, the State,
the County, and any local municipalities through which the proposed
26 Glaves, supra note 3 at 327, 328.
27 City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 137, 177 N.E. 2d 811, 813 (C-P.,
Cuyahoga County 1961).
28 23 U.S.C. § 128 (as amended 1968); OHIO REV. CODE § 5511.01 (1967).
29 U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY AND PROCEDURE MzMORANDUm 20-8, Transmit-
tal 147 (outlining public hearing procedures for federally funded highway projects)
(1969); OHiIO REv. CODE § 5511.01 (1967).
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highway passes must be obtained.30 Until all these actions are complete,
the areas (if any) of the fringe properties that will be needed remains
undetermined.
Waiting until the complete plans are prepared and approved (often
a period of three or four years), before starting acquisition of the
properties in the definite take areas, would be too costly and inefficient
to the appropriating authority. Once the centerline of the new high-
way is determined, the property owners likewise desire quick action.
If one knows his property is to be taken, he normally would not make
improvements, or take as much time or expense in maintaining his
property. He would like to relocate as soon as possible, especially in
times of rapid increases in mortgage rates and property values. There-
fore "advance acquisition" is practiced, where properties within the
definite take areas are appraised, acquired, and cleared. However
properties in the fringe areas, just across the street perhaps, are not
acted upon until final plans are prepared and approved. This procedure
can be very costly and frustrating to fringe area owners.
With the various complexities in mind, let us observe how the courts
have either disregarded or adjusted the "date of valuation equals date of
take" rule to avoid "unjust compensation."
As early as 1873, it was noted by the Federal Circuit Court for Ohio
that strict adherence to this rule could lead to an unjust result during a
temporary depression.8 ' The court adjusted the date of valuation to
two months before the trial to fix value stating:
While the language of the law or its construction is that its value
must be fixed as at the time of its appropriation or the taking of
the property, still it is not right that you should subject these prop-
erties to the consequences of what we all suppose to be a temporary
depression and stringency of the money market. If this were per-
mitted, it might have a great effect upon the value of this property.
Therefore, you will not take into consideration the state of affairs
existing today, but of, say two months ago, relieving it from the
pressure which may now be upon it.32
Thus the court recognized the general rule, but made an exception
to it. A sudden, temporary, economic effect, not any fault of the property
owner should not be made to work to his detriment.
In 1894 however, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County over-
ruled a common pleas court decision to set the date of take at a time
other than at the time of trial or actual possession, reinforcing the strict
application of the general rule."8 In that case, the value of the subject
property had decreased through normal market fluctuations from the
time of passage of an ordinance authorizing the city to appropriate cer-
tain property, until the date of trial. The Common Pleas Court had
charged the jury that the value of the property to be taken in the case at
hand was to be ascertained as of the day when the city had passed this
80 23 U.S.C. § 103 (e) (as amended 1968); OsIo REv. CODE § 5511.01 (1967).
31 United States v. In-Lots, 4 Ohio F. Dec. 268 (S.D.O. 1873).
32 Id. at 277.
33 Stribley v. City of Cincinnati, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 54 (1st Ohio Cir. Ct. 1894).
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ordinance. The Circuit Court overruled the decision on the basis of the
jury charge stating:
It would not be right for the corporation to pass an ordinance of
this kind and then wait for a considerable length of time, and after
the property of the owner had enhanced greatly in value, to take
it and pay the value as it was at the time of the passage of the
ordinance, when at the same time they were under no obligation
to the property owner to take his property. Neither would it be
just to the city that it should pay the value to the owner as of that
time, when at the time of the actual taking valuable improvements
had been removed . .. 3
In 1937 another Ohio Appellate court made an exception to the
general rule because of an economic depression, and affirmed the trial
court's decision to set the date of valuation at December, 1929, just
before the "great depression." 15
Until 1961 the courts had all recognized the general rule, and chose
either to strictly enforce it, 3 or make an exception to it by allowing
a valuation date before trial date when confronted by unnatural eco-
nomic effect. 37 Then came the case of City of Cleveland v. KacnarikY3
The City of Cleveland had filed an action to appropriate Kacmarik's
property because it was needed for urban renewal. While the case was
pending, but before actual possession for the public improvement, or
date of trial, the City's Division of Housing determined that the struc-
tures on the subject property were a hazard to the community and had
them demolished.3 9 The court, noting the possible injustice said:
"The fair market value of the property subject to appropriation is
to be computed as of the time of taking." . . . Turning to the instant
case, the court cannot escape the conclusion that there was a taking
of the property here involved . . . when the city entered thereon
and razed the buildings . . . The inescapable conclusion here is that
after a suit to condemn the property had been pending for about
nine weeks . . . the city, for one reason or another which it con-
sidered adequate, after a four day notice to the property owners,
entered upon the premises and destroyed the two buildings there-
on .... The court is convinced that to deny the rights of the prop-
erty owners to have a jury consider the question of compensation
for the buildings in question would work a taking of property
without due process. Concede that the city had a right to proceed
as it did, still it had a duty to compensate in full for the property
taken, if a jury so decides.40
The court held that the property was to be valued at a time just prior
to the razing of the structures by the city.4 '
34 Id. at 56.
35 Ornstein v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 26 Ohio L. Abs. 78, 36 N.E. 2d 521 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1937).
30 Stribley v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio C.C.R. 54 (1st Ohio Cir. Ct. 1894).
37 Ornstein v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 26 Ohio L. Abs. 78, 36 N.E. 2d 521 (2nd Ct.
App. 1937).
38 City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 177 N.E. 2d 811 (1961).
89 Id.
40 Id. at 137, 138, 177 N.E. 2d at 813, 814.
42 Id.
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Thus another apparent exception to the general rule had been made.
On the surface the date of valuation had been set prior to the date of
take because of the acts of the appropriating authority. In reality how-
ever, the court had merely added another circumstance that was con-
sidered a "taking," beyond the two accepted prior to its decision here
(date of trial and date of actual possession for the improvement). The
date of valuation was then established by this date of take, that is, the
date the structures were ordered demolished by the city.
At this point a closer look at the problem is necessary, and the term
"taking" must be defined. What governmental acts are to be considered
"takings"? The crux of the problem is the inherent conflict between so-
ciety and the individual. Under the Constitution individuals have basic
rights and freedoms, including the right to own and exercise dominion
over property.42 The sovereign states have the police power 43 which in
the area of property control includes the power to prevent one land use
from causing external harm to others. 44 Such lawful exercise of the
police power is not a "taking" for which compensation is due.45 The
power of eminent domain also established by constitutional provision, is
that power to compel certain land uses for the benefit of the public wel-
fare. Exercise of this power is a "taking" for which just compensation
must be made. 46
In some areas, particularly in urban renewal programs, it is neces-
sary yet extremely difficult, to distinguish between which are acts that
prevent or restrict property use for the benefit of the public welfare and
acts that compel certain property uses for the benefit of said public wel-
fare. The court in Kacmarik determined that the total effect of the acts
of the City of Cleveland in the clearing of the property was of a com-
pelling rather than a restricting nature, consequently there was a
"taking," and the date of take was established accordingly. 47
Could the same logic be applied in cases where properties were not
actually ordered to be cleared by the appropriating authority, but other
acts of this authority equally devalued the properties to be taken prior
to the time of trial? The landmark case of City of Cleveland v. Carcione4s
dealt with this question going one step beyond Kacmarik. The facts,
briefly were: In 1957 the City of Cleveland passed a resolution express-
ing its intent to appropriate property for an urban renewal project. Over
a period of the next six years, the city haphazardly appraised, acquired,
and cleared properties in the immediate vicinity of appellant Carcione's
42 U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV.
43 U.S. CoNSr. amend. X. See Mandelker, Housing Codes, Building Demolition, and
Just Compensation: A Rationale for the Exercise of Public Powers Over Slum Hous-
ing, 67 MicH. L. Rsv. 635 (1969), for a thorough discussion of bases of state regula-
tory power.
44 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
45 Id.
46 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see also Glaves, supra note 3 for extensive
discussion of "police power-taking dichotomy."
47 City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 137, 138, 177 N.E. 2d at 813, 814
(C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961).
48 City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E. 2d 52 (1963).
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sixteen-suite apartment building without contacting said property owner.
At the time of the trial the Carcione property was left standing in a
"vast desert" badly damaged by vandals and vermin. In the interim,
the County Welfare Department, working in conjunction with the city
on the renewal project, had urged relief tenants living in the area (some
living in the Carcione apartment building) to relocate. The Department
threatened to stop their welfare payments if they did not move. The
relief tenants living in the Carcione apartment building did in fact move
out pursuant to this urging. The resulting loss of income coupled with
other detrimental effects caused by acts of the city and its agents greatly
devalued the property. Increased vandalism and poor health standards
due to the haphazard demolition procedures employed by the city took
their toll on the value of the property.
At the trial in 1962 to fix the value of the Carcione property the
court instructed the jury that the standard by which compensation must
be measured was the fair market value of the property as of the time
of trial. The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County in 1963 reversed
on the basis of that jury instruction stating:
Under the facts in this case and the law applicable thereto, we con-
clude that Mrs. Carcione was entitled to an evaluation of her prop-
erty irrespective of any effect produced upon it by the action of the
city in carrying out the St. Vincent Urban Renewal Project. Hence,
the standard for measuring the compensation to be awarded her
should have been the fair market value of it as it was immediately
before the City of Cleveland took active steps to carry out the work
of the project which to any extent depreciated the value of the prop-
erty. As a consequence, we hold that the trial court was in error in
instructing the jury that the standard by which compensation was to
be measured was the fair market value of the property at the time
of the trial.
40
Although the appellate court left unclear whether it intended to dis-
regard the date of take standard of valuation, or had merely construed
the "active steps" of the condemning agency to be taking within the rule,
the stage was set for a thorough inspection and possible overhaul of the
general rule.
Since Carcione the courts have attempted the overhaul by two
methods, with the somewhat consistent result of giving the property
owner the benefit of the doubt when there is a property value decrease
in any way causally connected with the appropriating authority's acts
prior to appropriation. The two methods can be described as:
"Method A. Separate the previously inseparable date of take and
date of valuation. Set the date of valuation just prior to any acts of
the appropriating agency that were detrimental to the property
value, and in this way negate the effects of these acts. The date of
take will still be at trial or actual possession."
"Method B. Retain the well established "date of take equals date
of valuation" rule, but do not require that the date of take be at
the date of trial or actual possession. Instead, set the date of take
just prior to the detrimental effects of the acts of the appropriating
49 Id. at 533, 190 N.E. 2d at 57.
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authority if such acts could be considered a taking (as they were
in Kacmarik) ."
In January of 1966, the Supreme Court of Ohio in the Olrich case,
chose "Method B" as a basis upon which to make its determination.
Noting that the acts of the appropriating agency were not as severe as
those in the Carcione case, the court decided that there was not a
taking prior to the actual possession date.50
In City of Cincinnati v. Mandel, decided in December of 1966, the
Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County chose "Method A" to stray
from the general rule. The court made it clear that the date of take
would be that date on which the jury returns its verdict, but that the
date of valuation should be fixed as January 1, 1963, the approximate
time the city had started acquisition in the area of the Mandel property.5 1
"Method B" was employed by the Court of Appeals for Trumbull
County in the In Re Appropriation for Hwy. Purposes of Land of
Altshuler case decided in November of 1967.52 The facts were that the
Director of Highways filed a resolution and finding on September 24,
1965, which set forth that the property owners, pursuant to Sec. 5519.03
of the Ohio Revised Code, were required to vacate the property within
sixty days after service of said resolution and finding. This was complied
with, but after the owners left the property, and prior to trial or actual
possession by the Director of Highways, a third party entered upon
the premises and demolished the structure located thereon. The trial
court set the date of take at a time when the structure was still standing.
The Director of Highways appealed the decision on the basis that the
date of taking should be the date of trial. The appellate court affirmed
the decision of the trial court stating:
Under the facts and circumstances in the instant case, when the
Director chose to order the appellees to vacate their property pur-
suant to the mandatory provisions of section 5519.03 Revised Code,
and when the property owners (appellees) complied, having no
other choice, there was indeed a substantial interference with prop-
erty rights amounting to a "take" as of the date of the owners re-
moval.53
The theory underlying "Method A" was again employed in Long v.
Director of Highways, decided in February of 1968.14 The court noted
that with facts similar to those in the Carcione case, a property owner
could get an "exemption" from the rule that compensation shall be
awarded on the basis of value as of the date of actual possession. The
court also stated that the burden of showing facts and circumstances
justifying a departure from the general rule is upon the property
owner.55
50 Director of Highways v. Olrich, 5 Ohio St. 2d 70, 74, 213 N.E. 2d at 826.
51 38 Ohio Op. 2d 157, 224 N.E. 2d 179 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1966).
52 12 Ohio App. 2d 169, 231 N.E. 2d 476 (1967).
53 Id. at 172, 231 N.E. 2d at 478.
54 Long v. Director of Highways, 15 Ohio App. 2d 226, 240 N.E. 2d 569 (1968).
55 Id.
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The majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio also chose "Method B"
in a five-two decision of the case of Bekos v. Mashater decided June 19,
1968.56 The Court stated:
Where the value of private property appropriated for public use
by the Department of Highways has depreciated due to the activity
of the appropriating authority in acquiring other properties in the
immediate vicinity and demolishing buildings thereon, causing de-
terioration of the neighborhood and depreciation of the remaining
properties, a court may establish a date of take for the purpose of
valuation of the property taken which is reasonably related to such
activity of the appropriating authority, although prior in time to
the date of trial or the actual taking of possession. 57
The dissenting opinion written by Justice Brown with Chief Justice Taft
concurring, expresses the view that the general rule should be main-
tained intact, and agrees with the proposition that the value of the prop-
erty should be estimated irrespective of any effect produced by the pub-
lic project.
Brown stated:
The majority opinion confuses and merges the two concepts above;
that is the date of valuation and the elements of valuation. In an
effort to change the elements of evaluation in a difficult case, the
majority allows a trial court to change the date of valuation. This
holding is both unnecessary and unwise. It is unnecessary be-
cause the problem which this case raises can be adequately dealt
with by adherence to the rule, stated above, that value should be
estimated irrespective of any effect produced by the public project.
It is unwise because it takes from the jury important questions of
fact concerning whether particular aspects of depreciation were or
were not caused by acts of the condemnor. By setting the date of
valuation, the trial judge in this case made this decision and ex-
cluded determination of this issue by the jury.58
In March of 1969 the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County af-
firmed a decision of the trial court setting a date of valuation prior
to either the date of trial or date of actual possession.59 The Court
citing Bekos, stated that the "proper time for valuing the property is
before the value has depreciated due to the activity of the appropriating
authority in acquiring other properties and demolishing buildings in
the immediate vicinity causing deterioration of the neighborhood and
depreciation of the remaining properties." 60 The opinion does not
specifically state that there was a "taking" prior to trial or actual pos-
session, but is based upon the Bekos case which did make such determi-
nation. It thus appears that "Method B" reasoning was again em-
ployed.
Within a month the same appellate court, again relying on Bekos,
directed that a date of valuation prior to trial or actual possession be
56 15 Ohio St. 2d 15, 238 N.E. 2d 548 (1968).
57 Id., 238 N.E. 2d at 549.
fS Id. at 21, 238 N.E. 2d at 552.
59 In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, 18 Ohio App. 2d 116, 247 N.E. 2d 315
(1969).
60 Id.
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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established where the acts of the condemning authority had devalued
the subject property.6 1
In July of 1969 the Cuyahoga County Probate Court rendered
a decision clearly using "Method B." 62 Four appropriation cases, all
with facts very similar to those of the Carcione case, were consolidated
for the single purpose of determining the date of valuation. In the
wake of disputed facts as to the cause of the neighborhood deteriora-
tion and property devaluation, the judge set the date of take (and
therefore valuation) prior to most of the alleged detrimental acts of
the city engaged in an urban renewal program. Noting the intermit-
tent demolition, "on again off again" building code enforcement, poor
police protection, and lack of adequate garbage and rubbish removal,
the court found that the "taking" of the parcels had occurred on August
31, 1965.63 This date seemed arbitrarily set between the June 12, 1961
date on which the City Council had approved the renewal plan, and
the hearing of the case in July of 1969. The court may have attempted
to adjust the date of valuation so as to apportion the loss in value the
properties had undergone to both the owners and the city.
The most recent consideration of the date of take or date of valua-
tion standard was in the case of Cincinnati v. Dale.64 The Ohio Supreme
Court recognized a date of valuation of a few months prior to trial to
which both parties had agreed by stipulation. After the verdict had been
rendered but before the judgment entered thereon, the property owner
filed a motion for interest on the amount of the verdict from the date
stipulated as the date of valuation. In Ohio a condemnee property
owner is entitled to receive interest on any amount of the final award
which he has not received, from the time the property is taken by the
appropriating authority. 5 The Court maintained the date of valuation
as stipulated, but kept the date of take at the time of trial. This
analysis of the problem and recognition of "Method A" by the majority
was criticized by Justice Schneider in his concurring opinion. He states
that a "public authority has no right to stipulate a date of valuation
other than the date of take. If the value is higher on a date prior to
take, what law authorizes it to pay the higher value? If the value is
lower on a date prior to take, no reasonable condemnee would enter
such stipulation as found herein. The majority unnecessarily compli-
cates the law by recognizing a separate date of valuation in addition to
a date of take, date of trial, and date of payment." 66
61 In re Appropriation of Lands of Sproat, 20 Ohio App. 2d 166, 252 N.E. 2d 322
(1969).
62 City of Cleveland v. Hurwitz, 19 Ohio Misc. 184, 249 N.E. 2d 562 (1969).
63 Id. at 192.
64 20 Ohio St. 2d 32, 252 N.E. 2d 287 (1969).
65 Id.
6 Id. at 36, 252 N.E. 2d at 289.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Noting the criticism of and reluctance to use "Method A," and the
objections to "Method B" in addition to the somewhat limited appli-
cability of "Method B," when the acts of the appropriating authority
do not amount to a "taking" yet are detrimental to value,6 7 perhaps
another alternative method should be employed, as noted in the dissent
in Bekos.68
This writer recommends that a new method be adopted to more
properly strive for the "just compensation" the law requires. "The date
of take" should continue to be the later of either the date of trial or date
of actual possession by the appropriating authority. This "date of take"
would then be used for all purposes for which it is presently used,
except to establish a "date of valuation." The term "date of valuation"
would then merely refer to that date on which the case is tried. The
standard of compensation would be established as the fair market
value at time of trial or actual possession of the property to be taken
irrespective of any beneficial or detrimental effects on value caused di-
rectly or as a natural and probable consequence of acts of the ap-
propriating authority prior to taking.
The methods and procedures to be followed by the parties con-
cerning proof of these beneficial or detrimental effects on the value of
the property should conform to those evidentiary methods and pro-
cedures presently admissible to show damage or enhancement. The
property owner would be given the chance to demonstrate the value of
his property as it would have been were it not for the intervening acts
of the appropriating authority. Again the language of the dissent in
Bekos is noted, wherein the trial court would be instructed:
. . . to admit evidence offered which tends to show or negate de-
preciation of the value of the property connected with the acts of
the condemnor. Where the property owner is permitted to intro-
duce such evidence, the condemnor should be given equally broad
latitude to rebut such evidence so as to make up a proper factual
issue for the jury.6 9
In situations like those present in Carcione and Bekos, especially
where all the causes of the property devaluation are not apparent or un-
disputed, the selection of a date of valuation does not achieve the de-
sired result.70
Instead of trying to fit generally complex factual situations within
a rigid rule of value determination, the courts should allow the jury
to decide what effects the alleged detrimental acts of the appropriating
authority had on the value of the property to be taken, and extract those
effects from their determination of the just compensation required.
Elements of value such as physical characteristics, appearance, income
67 Director of Highways v. Olrich, 5 Ohio St. 2d 70, 213 N.E. 823 (1966).
68 15 Ohio St. 2d 15, 23, 238 N.E. 2d at 553.
6D Id.
70 Id. at 21, 238 N.E. 2d at 552.
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producing ability, and community development should be viewed ir-
respective of interference from the appropriating authority.
Adoption of this method may pose some mechanical difficulties in
that appraisals of property value are usually made as of a certain
date (not according to the effects of various acts on the elements of
valuation). Types of value evidence other than the presently accepted
expert testimony of real estate appraisers may be necessarily employed.
The courts may not readily relinquish their power to determine a date
upon which the property must be valued. The use of this method how-
ever, would insure the most equitable result. After all, isn't an equitable
result the essence of "just compensation?"
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